SOURCE: ERISA WATCH
Congress has determined that ERISA displaces “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), thus making almost every dispute over the operation and application of benefit plans an exclusively federal concern.
By Peter Sessions on April 8, 2026
Posted in ERISA Preemption
Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. Trustees of Operating Engineers’ Loc. 324 Fringe Benefit Funds, No. 25-1823, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 915042 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2026) (Before Circuit Judges Clay, Gibbons, and Hermandorfer)
ERISA practitioners are well aware of the broad preemptive scope the statutory scheme has. Congress has determined that ERISA displaces “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), thus making almost every dispute over the operation and application of benefit plans an exclusively federal concern. Indeed, every week we here at Your ERISA Watch catalogue cases where ERISA has preempted claims brought by plaintiffs (see below for examples in GS Labs, LLC v. Aetna and Gordon v. Sun Life).
In this week’s notable decision, however, we learn that ERISA preemption is not the pinnacle. Indeed, claims brought under ERISA can sometimes be preempted by something else. Read on to learn what that is and why one judge thinks that doesn’t make any sense.
The plaintiff in the case was Rieth-Riley Construction Company, the Indiana-based asphalt, concrete and paving outfit. Rieth-Riley and the Trustees of Operating Engineers’ Local 324 Fringe Benefit Funds (Local 324) are not on especially good terms with each other. They have been up to the Sixth Circuit twice in the last four years, litigating disputes arising from their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) – or lack thereof, depending on your perspective. (See our August 17, 2022 and June 12, 2024 editions for more details.)
In this decision they are back again for a third visit to the Sixth Circuit. The dispute arises from road construction work performed by Rieth-Riley in Michigan. Between 2013 and 2018, Rieth-Riley and Local 324 operated under a CBA which required Rieth-Riley to contribute to several of Local 324’s funds. The agreement was set to expire in June of 2018, but was mutually terminated one month prior to avoid triggering its “evergreen clause,” which would cause it to “continue in force from year to year” following its expiration.
After the CBA terminated, Local 324 refused to negotiate a new CBA, and Rieth-Riley attempted to continue contributing to the funds. These contributions were initially refused because the funds believed their relationship was governed by Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which does not obligate employers and unions to bargain for a new agreement or maintain the status quo during negotiations. Eventually, the funds agreed that Section 9(a) of the NLRA applied, which does obligate parties, after the expiration of a CBA, to maintain the status quo, including continuing fund contributions and bargaining in good faith.
The funds accepted the contributions until September of 2024, when they threatened to stop doing so unless Rieth-Riley gave the funds “‘written confirmation’ of its ‘agreement to comply with and be bound by the [Fringe] Funds’ trust agreements, plan documents, policies and procedures enforceable under CBA and federal law.’”
Rieth-Riley refused, contending that the funds had status quo obligations to continue accepting contributions. This led the funds to stop accepting contributions from October 1, 2024 onward. Rieth-Riley and three of its employees then brought this action alleging that the trustees violated their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence under ERISA by refusing to accept contributions.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that their ERISA claims were preempted by the “Garmon doctrine.” This doctrine, created by the Supreme Court in its 1959 case San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, requires courts to “defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board” (NLRB) on issues “arguably subject” to Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which issued this published opinion. The appellate court affirmed, agreeing with the district court that the Garmon doctrine controlled.
Plaintiffs contended that the Garmon doctrine (1) only applies to state law claims, and (2) only applies to federal claims “within the jurisdiction of the NLRB,” i.e., not ERISA claims. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments. The court emphasized that the doctrine applies to all federal claims arising from activities arguably subject to the NLRA, including ERISA claims. Plaintiffs argued that “their ERISA claims cannot be ‘arguably subject’ to the NLRA because the NLRB lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims,” but the Sixth Circuit termed this “a specious interpretation of the Garmon doctrine.” The court noted that plaintiffs cited no supporting case law and highlighted that plaintiffs’ own theory of the case involved a violation of Section 8 of the NLRA, which squarely brought their claims within the Garmon doctrine.
The Sixth Circuit further ruled that plaintiffs’ ERISA claims did not satisfy the “independent federal remedy exception” to the Garmon doctrine. The court found that plaintiffs’ ERISA allegations were “part and parcel” of the funds’ obligations under the NLRA, thus making them sufficiently intertwined such that the labor law questions were not “mere collateral issues.” According to the Sixth Circuit, “Plaintiffs’ ERISA claims can succeed ‘only if’ Defendants’ ‘conduct violates the NLRA,’ rendering the NLRA issues ‘anything but collateral.’”
Finally, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings denying plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief and denying Rieth-Riley’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits” and amendment would have been “futile.” As a result, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under the Garmon doctrine. If they still want relief, apparently they will have to get it from the NLRB.
Judge Whitney Hermandorfer penned a concurrence in which she agreed that Garmon preemption applied, but noted that “aspects of Garmon square poorly with jurisdictional first principles.”
She noted that ordinarily federal courts have an obligation to hear cases within their jurisdiction, and “federal statutes do not ‘preempt’ other federal statutes.” Thus, Garmon preemption is a “misnomer.” Judge Hermandorfer also noted problems with how such preemption could “toggle on and off” depending on how parties pressed their claims. She further warned that “applying Garmon to shunt statutory interpretation questions from courts to the [NLRB] might not withstand…scrutiny” under the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.
As a result, Judge Hermandorfer considered the 65-year-old Garmon decision to be on “shaky footing,” but was forced to concur with her two panelists because Garmon, and the Sixth Circuit case law interpreting it, barred adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims.
